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1 INTRODUCTION'
The frustrated cry that the institutions which so
deeply affect women's lives in so many countries
are not accountable to them belies the ubiquitous
belief that human beings should be able, individu-
ally and collectively, to determine the nature of the
structures which govern how they live their lives.
The modern demand for accountability is both a
recognition of the existence of qualities which dis-
tinguish humans from other sentient creatures and,
more importantly, a potently useful instrument for
protecting and (sometimes) nurturing those quali-
ties (dignity, hope, love, respect) which define our
human-ness.
Do the institutions most influential in determining
development strategies deny accountability to
women? As with the questions addressing the
democratic nature of any regime, institution, or
process, the answer will invariably depend upon
how the term is understood. This is not merely a
semantic quibble, as a great deal of political power
can lie in the ability of political actors to define the
terms of discourse in their own terms; and it is
useful to remember that institutions such as the
World Bank are manifestly not managed by women.2
The question of the extent to which a governance-
oriented approach facilitates accountability to
women qua women is irreducibly caught up in the
question of the extent to which it ought to do so.
My first task is to describe how the criteria of gov-
ernance (as accountability) is firmly grounded upon
the concept of consent as the principal prerequisite
of legitimate political authority; my second, to note
how consent has played an uncomfortably ambiva-
lent role in the ability of women as a social grouping
This article was written with the intrepid research assistance
of Eva Thurlow.
2 Since completing an internal studyin 1992, the World Bank has
increased the number of women in management from 9 per cent
to 11 per cent. It hopes to reach its short-term goal of 15 per cent
by 1997. But a glass ceiling remains: women account for 98 per
cent of secretarial staff, 26 per cent of professional staff, 11 per
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to achieve (or even articulate) distinct political
goals. My argument is that we can use the idea of a
'context of choice' (which underlies the expression
of women's subjective interests) in order to make
the (politically essential) concept of women's ob-
jective interests both useful and palatable. But,
situating this context of choice too firmly within a
discussion of identity as a primary good has very
unenticing disadvantages for those concerned with
changing the current conditions of women rather
than merely legitimizing them.
The recent emphasis upon governance by institu-
tions such as the World Bank as a framework for
policy-making (World Bank 1993; OECD 1993;
Bratton and Hyden 1992; Williams and Young
1994) has slightly but perceptibly shifted the terms
of evaluation for programmes from efficiency and
economic growth to whether the individuals af-
fected by such programmes find them credible
and worthy of support. Part of this trend has been
purely pragmatic, insofar as it is difficult to imple-
ment and administer effective programmes over a
long period of time without broad-based support3.
But the demise of cold war ideological polarization,
coupled with the limited achievements of more or-
thodox development approaches to date, have
obliged (and permitted) such powerful institutions
to think hard about the reasons why certain policies
manifestly lacked wide-scale support. Given this
focus upon participation, pluralism, and account-
ability, there seems to be good reason to believe
that greater efforts will be made both to listen to
women's voices, and to facilitate the participation
of women in policy making at institutional and
local levels.
cent of management and one of 22 executive positions.' The
Globe and Mail (8 October 1994), AlO.
Williams and Young (1994) give specific reasons for the emerg-
ence of the governance issue within the Bank: experience with
adjustment lending, internal bank factors, academic influences,
and current fashion.
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Yet the stress upon widespread acceptability as the
pre-eminent standard of political legitimacy none-
theless poses potentially serious threats to WID
programmes. This is because the fundamental idea
underlying the authority of concepts such as par-
ticipation, accountability, pluralism, and so on
(i.e., traditional liberal ideals) is consent: certain
practices are acceptable - and thus carry political
authority - because all involved have agreed to
them. But the emphasis upon consent in place of
the achievement of more objective and concrete
standards can itself be utilized to validate and to
entrench the status quo.
Despite the obvious appeal of policy making based
upon a principle of individual and collective self-
determination, one ought to pay close heed to the
ambivalent role of consent-based accounts of gov-
ernance upon which liberal-democratic polities are
grounded. From the seventeenth century on, for
example, the doctrine of consent as the sine qua non
of political legitimacy (and thus political obliga-
tion) was frequently used as a means to justify
growing material inequalities between classes
(and to reinforce the unequal power relationship
between adult women and men). As feminists within
liberal polities have become increasingly wary
about offering unqualified support for consent-
based accounts of legitimacy in policy-making, it is
perhaps useful to discuss the double-edged nature
of this concept within the context of the WID strat-
egies and objectives which risk becoming under-
mined by selective (but common) interpretations
of consensual legitimacy. Women cannot afford to
dismiss the value of consent or consent-based theo-
ries, as they provide a strong basis for individual
autonomy and political strength. But consent is,
nonetheless, an ambiguous term that must be
understood clearly, and used judiciously.
2 PROVISION AND AGENCY AS COMPETING
BASES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY
The evocative appeal of democracy has frequently
rested upon its role as stalwart champion of the
disadvantaged: 'majority rule was originally attrac-
tive because it was an ideology of opposition, an
ideology that was not about government but rather
That women are disadvantaged vis-à-vis men by specific
development strategies is discussed, e.g., by Myra Buvinic,
'Women's issues in Third World poverty,' in Buvinic, Lycette, and
McGreevy, eds. Women and Poverty in the Third World
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about displacing entrenched élites, undermining
the powerful, and empowering the powerless'
(Wertheimer 1990; Shapiro 1990). But the assertion
that the powerless ought to be empowered stems
as much from the visceral evidence of the conse-
quences of their powerlessness as from an abstract
belief in the value of human autonomy. That basic
needs are simply not being met is much more dir-
ect and compelling evidence of egregious govern-
ment than the circumscribed scope of political par-
ticipation in an educated, well-fed, and healthy
population.
The gradual acceptance of democratic political
norms globally would seem to augur well for those
concerned with the well-being of women. But
democracy as a specific account of justifiable au-
thority is not, in its more formal manifestation,
about meeting the physical needs of those who
are the most disadvantaged: it is about securing
the consent of the majority in order to act on behalf
of the polity. The two accounts do not always
coincide. And, as democratic (or consent-based)
principles increasingly define political legitimacy,
those accounts of representation not explicitly based
on consent are more and more frequently spurned
or devalued. But consent is far more difficult to
measure satisfactorily than material standards of
living; and specific interpretations of what consti-
tutes consent (as well as cultural variations concern-
ing the value of consent) make the concept formi-
dable to apply in practice. The brutal paradox is that
while the least controversial evidence of women's
marginalization is the striking physical and eco-
nomic disparity they experience4, such disparity
can be dismissed as relevant proof of marginalization
as long as women are perceived to have 'consented'
to such conditions. Thus the recent emphasis upon
democracy as consensual policy making as the un-
disputed standard of organizational legitimacy
could, ironically, undermine the authority of WID
groups which expect that greater democratization
will bolster their attempts to further the interests
of women who are physically, economically, and
culturally marginalized. If democratic governance
becomes the principle by which programmes are
evaluated, the political battle for WID will increas-
ingly be to articulate women's consent in a way that
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1983) and Barbara
Lewis, 'The impact of development policies on women,' in
Margaret Jean Hay and Sharon Stichter (eds), African Women
South of the Sahara (1991).
does not reinforce their social and economic
inarginalization.
One of the few undisputed characteristics of de-
mocracy is the claim that the legitimacy of represen-
tation in the modern world rests unequivocally
upon the assertion that the body claiming repre-
sentative authority is democratic. Rather than nar-
rowing down the field of what can be considered
legitimate representation, however, this has merely
expanded the claims of what constitutes democracy
(Fierlbeck 1994) In many instances this willingness
to probe and to question the nature of democracy
and liberalism have facilitated the goals of WID:
the assumption that the problems addressed by
development theory are gender-neutral, for exam-
ple, has been shown to be an instance of episte-
mological myopia. Women have been cut out of, or
disadvantaged by, development programmes be-
cause of the lack of crucial information regarding
women's roles, values, and preferences. This infor-
mation was not collected because women's roles,
values, and preferences were considered either
unimportant, or identical to accounts articulated
by men. This assumption of sameness has been
increasingly challenged; but the political results
dc not seem to be commensurate with the formal
acknowledgement of the relevance of these episte-
mological challenges.
That women, as an identifiable group, are mani-
festly disadvantaged materially vis-à-vis men
within their own societies can be understood to be
unacceptable for different reasons. One common
claim, for example, is simply that it is wrong that
their material and physical needs are not being
met. Another is that this rnarginalization is evi-
dence that women do not have an equal voice in
determining the way in which their society ought
to be governed, and that this political exclusion is
wrong. The argument that political legitimacy de-
pends upon meeting the physical needs of a group
is one of the oldest justifications of any particular
political authority. John Locke made this point
quite clearly when addressing the assertion by Sir
Robert Filmer that the power of sovereigns was
paternal in nature, and thus absolute. Locke's ar-
gument against absolute sovereignty based upon
divine right was that religious tenets made it quite
clear that the sovereign was responsible to God to
look after the welfare of the subjects: just as
shepherds were employed by farmers to look after
the well-being of the flock, and did not have the
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authority to harm them at will, so too was the
sovereign in a fiduciary trust with God to ensure
that the needs of all of God's subjects were met as
effectively as possible (Locke 1960). Thus the au-
thority of a monarch was not simply given in the
word of God, but depended more substantially
upon the ability of the sovereign to meet the terms
of the fiduciary trust placed upon him by God.
While modern liberal democracies assume elec-
toral accountability to underlie the legitimacy of
their regimes, the criterion that voters frequently
use to judge the relative merit of competing repre-
sentatives is the extent to which they deem that a
candidate or party will facilitate (or has already
facilitated) the material prosperity of the polity (or
the subgroup in which the voter classes herself). It
is arguable, too, that the perceived illegitimacy of
formerly communist states was grounded as much
upon the failure of such states to provide material
goods as effectively as market states, as it was
upon the inability of most citizens to participate in
establishing the rules governing their polity. A few
contemporary states do partially justify their au-
thority upon their ability to provide for the basic
needs of their populations. That a regime has in-
creased the health and educational levels of its
population, the agricultural productivity of the
land, the strength of the economy, and the stability
of the social order cannot summarily be dismissed
as a claim to good governance, especially when the
argument is presented that the provision of basic
goods and services would not have been as possible
within a state where political power is not strongly
centralized (c.f. Jeffries 1993). Macpherson (1965)
has argued that this is itself a justifiable form of
democracy in which the emphasis is 'on ends, not
means': 'Eilt is to make the criterion of democracy
the achievement of ends which the mass of the
people share and which they put ahead of separate
individual ends. And this of course is the classic,
pre-liberal, notion of democracy..'
Problems arise, however, when basic needs are
seen to have been met and further demands are
placed on political actors. Once the population is
literate, healthy, educated, and well-fed, which (or
whose) needs ought to be addressed?
-
The increasing wealth and political fragmentation
of seventeenth-century England led many political
theorists to argue that the optimal form of political
association was one based upon the consent of all
individuals. But the normative force of consent as
the basis of political authority, according to
Macpherson (1962), must be understood within the
context of a nascent capitalist economy. The author-
ity of the market required the assumption that those
engaged in commercial exchanges did so of their
own volition, were aware of the obligations im-
posed by contract, and agreed to be bound thereby.
if human beings were presumed to be hierarchically
ordered, with some individuals being naturally
more gifted or deserving than others, the argument
could be made that any exchanges were not equally
binding on all parties (just as a contract negotiated
between an adult and a young child is never strictly
enforced because of the inequality in competence
between the two). For capitalism to be seen as fair,
the contracting parties had to be understood to be
equal, the contract had to be seen to be freely en-
tered into, and - most importantly - being res-
ponsible for contracts freely entered regardless of
the outcome was to be taken as the ultimate prin-
ciple of justice. Capitalism could only function if
inequalities were seen as just; and therefore justice
had to mean accepting responsibility for the conse-
quences of one's actions.
It was justice in the economic realm, then, which
influenced the interpretation of legitimate political
representation as representation to which indi-
viduals consented directly. As the ideal of consent
increasingly became accepted as the standard of
political legitimacy, liberal regimes could less con-
vincingly argue that women's voices were irrel-
evant because their interests were self-evidently
met by fathers and husbands; or that colonial ter-
ritories' interests were addressed by imperial regimes.
If each individual entity were equal in what was
fundamentally important, then each individual was
entitled to consent or dissent regardless of any other
criterion. Disallowing the vote to women or deny-
ing a colony self-determination had been justified
ideologically on the basis that they were better
provided for under the guidance and authority of
their masters. But the normative force of individual
autonomy was effectively engaged to contest the
justifiability of constraining individual agency.
The moot point, of course, was determining what,
precisely, constituted consent (c.f. Pitkin 1965). As
the political manifestation of consent - voting -
became increasingly institutionalized, the condi-
tions under which consent was assumed to exist
within the sphere of commercial contract were
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usually unarticulated and so the dynamics of power
within consensual market relations were not for-
mally addressed. The past decades' experience of
political rule within command economies may
have illustrated the possibility that consent, which
requires some formulation of meaningful choice
of alternatives, may be difficult, if not impossible,
without some underlying market system that per-
mits a strong diffusion of political power. Simply
to assume that exit is an acceptable form of voice
is, of course, unappealing for a number of reasons.
But economic sovereignty, both of producers and
consumers, is one of several very useful choices or
strategies in articulating the absence of consent;
and especially so when one finds oneself in a politi-
cal minority. But if the usefulness of a market
should not be underestimated in determining the
context of consent, so too should it not be over-
estimated. The more credence a society places
upon 'consent' as the requirement for legitimate
governance, the more the society must investigate
conditions in which consent is presumed to have
been given.
3 INTERESTS AND IDENTITIES:
CONSTRUCTING THE 'CONTEXT OF CHOICE'
How ought consent to be understood? Carole
Pateman (1988,1992) has explored the way in which
women have been presumed to consent to a status
to which rational, autonomous male citizens would
never submit:
The presumed consent of a woman, in a free
marriage contract, to her subordinate status
gives a voluntarist gloss to an essentially as-
cribed status of 'wife.' If the assumption of
natural subjection did not still hold, liberal
democratic theorists would long ago have be-
gun to ask why it is that an ostensibly free and
equal individual should always agree to enter
a contract which subordinates her to another
such individual.
(1988: 9)
But what women putatively consented to were not
the terms of a negotiable contract, but 'to a status
which in its essence was hierarchical and unalter-
able'. To what extent was the decision not to get
married within the confines of such a contract an
authentic choice? If the essence of womanhood
were defined by her status as a wife and mother,
then an unmarried and childless woman would
be a freakish monstrosity without any social iden-
tity; and any decision to accept this unpalatable
alternative could itself well constitute proof of an
irrational disposition.
It is in this way not the definition of women's
interests but of meaningful choice which has be-
come the most difficult theoretical obstacle for
feminists. 'The most heavily charged conflict within
the discourse about the concept of interests in mod-
ern times,' writes Anna Jonasdottir (1988), 'concerns
the question of objective and subjective interests'.
The reasons for this conflict are by now quite well
known: to say that women as a class do have
objective interests which must be addressed des-
pite individual preferences devalues their own sub-
jective articulation of what is important to them;
while to admit only that women have subjective
interests makes it all but impossible to address the
disparities and attitudes that disadvantage women
qua women. The accounts offered by theorists such
as Jonasdottir (1988) and Molyneux (1985) to resolve
this conflict have of themselves been quite persua-
sive: the solution to the dilemma of interests, of
course, has been to distinguish between agency (or
subjective interests) and the context within which
agency can properly be said to be exercised:
The main advantage of such a distinction is that
it permits the resolution of the conflict sur-
rounding objective and subjective interests. The
concept's formal aspect becomes primary so
that the content of needs and desires is, from
the point of view of interest, an open question.
In a certain way this means that only 'subjec-
tive' interests exist ... [and yet] [u]nderstood
historically, and seen as emerging from people's
lived experiences, interests about basic proc-
esses of social life are divided systematically
between groups of people in so far as their
living conditions are systematically different.
Thus, historically and socially defined, interests
can be characterized as 'objective'
(Jonasdottir 1988: 41).
In other words, it is possible to speak of objective
interests insofar as the formal or subjective aspect
of interest-articulation is limited because certain
individuals, by virtue of their membership within
an identifiable group, are denied a range of reason-
able choices. The ability to choose between choices
without paying a high price for doing so can be
said to be in women's objective interests without
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delimiting the content of their choices for them.
But this resolution raises further queries about pre-
cisely which conditions must exist for subjective
interests to be reflectively chosen rather than uncon-
sciously preferred. For, while the provision of cer-
tain material goods and formal political institutions
would seem to constitute a basic requirement for the
exercise of agency, many feminists and thoughtful
liberals are changing the contours of the discourse
surrounding the context of choice to argue that, in
addition to material equality of condition and for-
mal political equality, the assumption of choice is
empty without a strong conception of identity
within which choice is constructed. 'Consider,' asks
Charles Taylor, 'what we mean by identity:'
[IJt is who we are, "where we're coming from."
As such it is the background against which our
tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations
make sense ... my discovering my own identity
doesn't mean that I work it out in isolation,
but that I negotiate it through dialogue, partly
overt, partly internal, with others'
(1991: 34).
Why is identity important? It is a fundamental
aspect of any political system that holds choice and
choosing to be crucial in determining the best life
to live, in constructing a coherent account of politi-
cal obligation, and in solidifying political legiti-
macy and authority. Liberal theory holds that
'the freedom to form and revise our beliefs about
value is a crucial precondition for pursuing our
essential interest in leading a good life' (Kymlicka
1989: 163) But where do these beliefs about value
come from?
The decision about how to lead our lives must
ultimately be ours alone, but this decision is
always a matter of selecting what we believe to
be most valuable from the various options avail-
able, selecting from a context of choice which
provides us with different ways of life.
(Kymlicka 1989: 164)
Thus we cannot expect that people can make defi-
nite choices unless they have a conception of what
is valuable to them; and they cannot construct a
framework of value unless 'they fit into some pat-
tern of activities which is culturally recognized as a
way of leading one's life' (Kymlicka 1989:165). The
political force of consent, based as it is upon choos-
ing one particular alternative rather than any other
within a range of choices, thus requires a 'situated'
account of value.
But what is the implication of this for women? To
the extent that female identity is wrapped tightly in
reproductive functions or the emotional nurturing
of others, and male identity is not, the political
legitimacy of consent (based on the availability of
choice, which is itself firmly grounded in traditions
which entrench the hegemony of maternal iden-
tity), will only structure women's choices in such a
way that reinforces the current division of power
between genders. Moreover, such a division will be
increasingly considered legitimate because women
have consented to such roles within an ostensibly
open context of choice. There is no basis for chal-
lenging gender-based inequality if it is a result of
free choice. If women understand that they can
choose unattached lives free from the physical,
psychological, and material demands of spouse-
hood or motherhood, but still choose more tradi-
tional roles, then we simply cannot explain this
away through references to women's own lack of
consciousness of oppression. That women 'inter-
nalize' certain sentiments or values (Staudt 1990:
305) is no longer a claim of false consciousness that
negates the claim of consent; it is a perfectly accept-
able formation of a decision made within a specific
context of choice which emphasizes the validity of
the consensual choice made by women. But if a
young woman has the formal choice to become an
unattached professional, or to become a wife and
mother first and foremost, to what extent is this a
free and conscious choice if the woman's mother
(or family, or society) professes disappointment (or
disdain, or hostility) at the prospect of a single and
barren daughter? To what extent does the free
choice to engage in traditional roles diminish the
'free' choice of a minority not to do so? And to
what extent should this framework of choice be
legitimized simply because this is the social context
within which a woman's identity has developed?
The resolution to the problem of objective/subjec-
tive interests offered by Jonasdottir works only as
long as the context of choice is considered to be
purely formal or material. But if Taylor (1991,
1992), Young (1989, 1990), and Kymlicka (1989) are
correct in arguing that a stable social and cultural
environment is yet another crucial variable in deter-
mining personal choices (because 'it's only through
having a rich and secure cultural structure that
people can become aware, in a vivid way, of the
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options available to them, and intelligently examine
their value' [Kymlicka 1989: 165]), then women's
value specifically as mates or mothers becomes
emphatically pronounced. The problem is not that
women lack consciousness of themselves as women,
but that they are all too conscious of themselves as
women, when being a woman means fulfilling a
specific socially-defined role. If we then accept, as
Jonasdottir urges us, the primacy of formal or sub-
jective interests, once we have determined that a
viable 'context of choice' exists, then we are obliged
to accept that women's own declaration of their
interests as wives and mothers is what is truly
important to them. And if they themselves articulate
this account of interests, it becomes even more
difficult for other women to argue why these
choices, based as they are upon a given social con-
text, are not valuable to them.
Accepting cultural membership as a primary good
in the formation of a context of choice means that
women will face increased difficulty in justifying
why they wish to take advantage of formal oppor-
tunities that do not recognize their cultural value
as women. Thus, rather than alleviating the femi-
nist dilemma of choosing between the objective
and subjective interests of women, Jonasdottir's
account together with current arguments for the
normative force of identity (determined within so-
cial contexts) only reinforces the claim that women
are in unequal positions because they have chosen
to put themselves there. And because they have so
chosen (understanding what the alternatives are),
they are obliged politically to support the resulting
social and political relations.
4 CONCLUSION: CHOICE, AUTÖNOMY AND
RESPECT WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF
ACCOUNTABILITY
If the most tangible and emphatic proof of the
necessity for WID programmes is the material con-
ditions of women vis-à-vis men, this evidence be-
comes ineffective as a means of contesting the legiti-
macy of policy processes as long as inequalities
are deemed to have been the product of consent.
Accountability, if it is to be accepted by women's
groups as the new standard of political legitimacy,
must involve a great deal of discussion regarding
the particular nature of consent involved. The as-
sumption of liberal democracy as a neutral context
of choice has rightly been challenged (Young 1990).
But as long as a legitimate context of choice is
perceived to be situated within existing social con-
texts, where the identity of women is structured by
reproductive roles, the value of consent for women
will not be fully realized.
In liberal theory, the normative force of consent
carries with it a grim and disagreeable price: the
obligation not to challenge decisions made by au-
tonomous agents which we may find tremendously
unpalatable. If the moral foundation of consent as
the basis of political authority derives from the
claim that individual adults are responsible agents
who can - and must - take responsibility for their
actions, then we cannot deny them the self-deter-
mining (but unappealing) choices which they
make. The current debates within liberal theory
which offer the most rich and provocative contri-
butions to intellectual thought are those which ask
under what conditions consent (or the selection of
meaningful choices) can be said to obtain. And it
is here that liberalism reaches its most thoughtful
potential by reaching into the other two most
alluring and influential schools of twentieth-
century thought - socialism and postmodernism -
and confronting their discomforting challenges to
the complacent assumptions of consent.
Although Marxism seems to have been politically
discredited by its economic inadequacies and its
severe circumscription of political liberty, its most
discerning insights will be powerfully relevant as
long as political authority and market systems co-
exist. As long as significant material inequalities
remain, the potential for distortions of acceptable
relations of power will exist between formally equal
individuals. This does not negate the possibility of
constructing a political system based upon consent;
but it does oblige us to monitor and debate the
conditions under which material conditions un-
duly influence the calculation of consent.
More inchoately, but perhaps more devastatingly,
the ragged but vociferous postmodern movement
has presented an even more serious challenge to
the doctrine of consent as the basis of legitimate
authority. While the coherence of an argument
grounding political legitimacy upon consent rests
upon the premise of individual autonomy in deci-
sion-making, an increasing number of theorists
have challenged the intelligibility of this assump-
tion. Rather than existing as self-contained agents
wafting through a universe of endless choices,
we are situated creatures who are continually and
29
insidiously affected by the more fundamental
emotional and psychological ties which we require
in order to perceive choices in the first place. Lone-
liness or social censure or insecurity are formid-
able obstacles to an individual's ability to make
specific choices even when formal political and
substantive economic equality exists.
Thus I wish to deny neither the philosophical force
of the accounts offered by theorists such as
Jonasdottir or Kymlicka, nor the normative reso-
nance of political authority based upon the idea of
consent. To the contrary, I desire only to caution
that we must be fully cognizant of what types of
variables constitute limitations upon our ability
freely to choose the types of political constraints
within which we agree to live our lives.
Women as a group may, paradoxically, expand
their context of choice if they are more willing to
view themselves as individuals within arbitrary
and contingent environments rather than as mem-
bers of the class of women simply because women
have been socially and culturally defined as a
group for too long. The value of such a radical in-
dividualist approach is not in its atomistic premises
but in its ability to make us aware of the extent to
which we unquestioningly accept our society's
choices as our own. Only when we consciously
acknowledge the extent to which our social bonds
themselves construct our context of choice can we
realize that changing this context is itself a possi-
bility; and it is only when we can effectively influ-
ence this web of contingencies within which our
lives are shaped that consent can become a forceful
basis of political authority for women.
Consent, as a basis of political authority, remains a
forcefully compelling principle because it recog-
nizes so many of the human qualities - autonomy,
dignity, responsibility - which we collectively
value. But to revere the concept of consent means
that we must respect the unpalatable decisions made
by others and respect, in turn, means that we cannot
ultimately challenge the autonomy of the decision
makers. Thus the more we respect consent, the
less capable we are of investigating the context of
choice; and the less satisfied we are with the context
of choice, the less respect we have for the principle
of consent in practice. To break this circle we must
be willing to probe and to query the choices and
decisions of 'autonomous' agents; for consent itself
is not only a moral construct but, more tangibly, a
potently political device for ensuring obedience.
Instruments of such palpable power must always
be carefully and consistently scrutinized: and we
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